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 Appellants, the City of Moab and Moab City Council (City) submit the 
following memorandum of points and authorities in this case. 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
This case is an appeal of the final judgment of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in a municipal land use matter.  Review by the trial court was based on the 
administrative record, per U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(i).  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(b)(i)(appeals of 
adjudicative proceedings of political subdivisions or local agencies).  
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 
1. Did the trial court err in overruling a decision to deny a conditional use 
permit where the proposed land use was contrary to the terms of a municipality’s 
General Plan, as made mandatory by ordinance? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that a municipal land use decision was 
the product of improper public clamor in the absence of a finding of improper 
purpose or discriminatory motive? 
3. Where an adjudicative decision by a local government did not include 
express findings of fact, did the trial court err in failing to order a remand for 
clarification of the basis for decision? 
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4. Did the trial court err in applying the substantial evidence standard of review 
as to a local government land use decision where the court engaged in its own fact 
finding and ignored or discounted the testimony as mere speculation or clamor? 
III.  PRESERVATION OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
 
1. The lack of conformity of the land use application with the provisions of the 
Moab General Plan was litigated before the trial court.  See Record, 0476-0488 
(City of Moab’s Brief in Opposition to Petitioners’ Brief on Appeal, R. 0480, 
0484); also R. 1081-1082 (oral argument).   
2. The proper application of the so-called public clamor doctrine was litigated 
before the trial court.  R. 0476-488 (Defendants’ Brief at R. 0481); also, R. 1076-
1077 (oral argument). 
3. The issue pertaining to findings of fact was litigated before the trial court.  
The issue was briefed, R. 0485-0486 (Defendants’ Brief), and covered at oral 
argument.  R. 1094, 1102 (discussing remand for further findings as remedy).  
4. The correct standard of review was briefed.  R. 0480-0481.   
IV.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
The City of Moab appeals the decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court 
reversing the City’s denial of a conditional use permit for the operation of a 
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lodging facility in a residential neighborhood.  The Appellees, Jeremy McElhaney 
and Mary McElhaney (Owners), sought approval of a conditional use permit for 
the operation of a bed and breakfast facility in an area of the City zoned for 
residential development.  After review by the City staff and the Planning 
Commission, the City Council concluded that the application should be denied 
because of adverse impacts on the neighborhood.   
The Owners brought an action alleging, inter alia, that the City Council 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.  The trial court, reviewing the record, 
reversed the City Council decision, and this appeal follows.  The relevant facts are 
as follows: 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
1. The Plaintiffs submitted an application for approval of conditional use 
permit for a bed and breakfast facility to be located at their property at 100 Arches 
Drive in Moab.  Record 0851. 
2. The proposal calls for new construction of a 3,721 square foot home with 
attached structures totalling 1,152 and 864 square feet, for a total of 5,737 square 
feet of new construction.  Id.  All structures would be two story, and the facility 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all citations are to the numbered record pages on file 
with the court and distributed to the parties. 
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would have five guest bedrooms.  Id.  The Owners would continue to reside on 
the property, and they stated that they would build the residence as planned, 
regardless of whether or not they obtained conditional use permit approval to 
operate a bed and breakfasts.  R. 0208; 0320. 
3. The subject property is located in the R-2 residential zone, and is located in a 
developed subdivision including single family homes.  Id. and R. 095-0103 
(photographs depicting the neighborhood).   
4. The subject lot is 0.57 acres in area, or roughly 24,829 square feet.  R. 0209 
(minutes of testimony by Jeremy McElhaney); R. 0259 (Site Plan). A significant 
portion of the lot is hillside. R. 0106-0115 (photographs of the area).    
5. The subject property comprises a single lot located at the end of a residential 
cul-de-sac with only one means of ingress/egress.  R. 110 (aerial photo of subject 
lot). 
6. Properties adjacent to the proposed bed and breakfast are all single family 
residences.  See Id.; R. 092. 
7. City staff noted that application showed parking for five vehicle spaces, four 
trailer spaces (for recreational equipment), and six enclosed garage parking spaces.  
R. 0119, ¶ 4 (staff report).  The Owners concur with those numbers, though they  
note the site could house up to six guest trailers, depending on their size.  R. 0207 
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(minutes of Planning Comm. September 11, 2014). 
8. City staff noted that the ITE traffic manual estimates that a bed and breakfast 
can assume 8.9 average daily trips per day (ADT) per room, together with 10-12 
ADT for a single family residence.  R. 0119.  This would result in an average of 
54.5 to 56.5 ADT for the subject facility.  Staff noted that there could be some 
variation in these vehicle counts. Id. 
9. The application was reviewed by the Planning Commission on September 
11, 2014, and the hearing was continued until September 25, 2014.  R. 0205, 
0213.   
10. Several neighbors voiced concerns at the hearing, as reflected in the staff 
report, minutes, and written comments provided to the Planning Commission, staff, 
and later, the City Council.  Neighbor comments were primarily addressed to the 
issues of traffic, noise, parking, storm water drainage, and general incompatibility 
of the use with the neighborhood.  Id.  
11. The Planning Commission subsequently recommended approval of the 
conditional use permit, subject to four conditions.  R. 085-086 (Staff Report).  
These conditions included: 
a. The bed and breakfast shall be reviewed each year for code 
compliance; 
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b. All lighting shall be downward directed full cutoff as required by 
MMC 17.09.660(H), Lighting Plan; 
c. Fending and/or landscaping shall be used to buffer the parking area 
and the entrance from the street; and 
d. The daycare center will discontinue operations one the bed and 
breakfast facility is operational2.   
12. The City Council, as land use authority, considered the conditional use 
permit application at a public hearing on October 28, 2014. R. 0324, et seq. 
(Council Transcript). 
13. A couple living immediately adjacent to the subject property, provided 
written comments about parking, increased traffic, and noise.  R. 0216-219.  The 
neighbors stated that: a) Arches Drive is a cul de sac, and that all traffic would 
have one means of ingress/egress; b) Arches Drive has 11 residential structures, 
two of which are duplexes; c) based on cited Federal Highway Administration 
                                                 
2 The Owners own a home at 95 Arches Drive, adjacent to the subject property.  
At this location the Owners have operated an in-home child day care business.  
This business, though a permitted use under the R-2 zoning designation, has been 
the subject of neighbor complaints about excessive traffic.  R. 0217.  At least one 
neighbor stated that this level of traffic is an unacceptable “benchmark” for the 
area.  R. 0231, 0233. Another witness noted that traffic will increase, relative to 
the existing day care, because of the limited number of families using that day 
care, as compared to likely use of the bed and breakfast.  R. 0338-0339. 
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Data, the average driver in a residential area generates five round trips per day; d) 
the existing residents generate 130 vehicle trips per day; d) the addition of a bed 
and breakfast would generate at least 50 additional trips per day, an increase of 
38%; and e) the use of Off Highway Vehicles (OHVs) brought by guests would 
increase that traffic burden.  R. 0216-219; 0223-0224.  These neighbors also 
noted that the operation of a bed and breakfast would result in different traffic 
patterns, at all hours of day or night, and particularly on weekends.  R. 0217; also 
0340. 
14. Because of the proximity of the subject property to Sand Flats Road, a 
locally significant recreation area, and the Owners’ statements about parking OHV 
trailers on the property, the neighbors expressed the concern that noise from OHVs 
would be significant and likely violate City ordinances.  R. 0218.  Citing a State 
of California noise study, the neighbors noted that OHVs emit noise at the rate of 
75 to 80 decibels at a distance of 50 feet, which is in excess of Moab Municipal 
Code ordinances, Section 17.74.080, which limits noise to 65 decibels. Id. They 
noted that routine use of OHVs staged at the bed and breakfast would alter the 
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quiet of the neighborhood and constitute a nuisance3.  Id.    
15.  Other persons expressed concerns about increased traffic on the cul de sac, 
noise, and safety for residents.   R. 0203; 0222.  One neighbor noted that the 
applicant was required to show, under the applicable ordinance, that the application 
had a “clearly minimal negative impact,” and that the proposal did not meet that 
exacting standard due to its alteration of the character of the residential 
neighborhood, again due to traffic and noise, from guests, employees, and OHV 
riders.  R. 0231-232.  Other long-term residents objected to the encroachment of a 
commercial use into an existing residential neighborhood, and observed that the 
proposed bed and breakfast would result in qualitative changes in traffic, because 
of the behavior of tourists and the odd hours when they would be coming and 
going to the site.  R. 0233; R0240-0241 
16. At least one person stated his support for the application, and his belief that 
it would not result in additional noise or traffic. R. at 0221. 
17. One resident of Arches Drive lost a contract to sell his home to an existing 
tenant because of the pending bed and breakfast conditional use permit application.  
                                                 
3 Another witness noted that one of the Owners is a former president of a four 
wheel drive club, and that OHV enthusiasts will naturally be drawn to the location.  
R. 0341.  Although the broader issue is not well defined in the record, OHV use, 
and particularly noise in residential areas, is a matter of significant local concern in 
Moab.   
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R. 0255. 
18. At the public hearing, a long-time resident who is a retired traffic engineer, 
provided testimony that he reviewed the development file and there was no traffic 
study present.  He testified that that traffic and noise in the neighborhood would 
increase; that the steep grades on Arches Drive meant that vehicles would be 
working harder and emitting more noise as they descend or ascend; and that the 
neighborhood was otherwise a quiet and good place where children can play in the 
street.  R. 0353-0357; R. 0288-0289.  This neighbor also testified that OHV noise 
is likely to range between 80 and 100 decibels (range for motorcycles and all 
terrain vehicles); Id. at 0355-0356.  He noted that a 10 decibel increase in noise is 
equal to a ten fold increase sound intensity.  Id.   
19. An attorney representing neighbors living on Arches Drive voiced concerns 
about the compatibility of the bed and breakfast use with the neighboring 
residential uses; the dead end street location; the size of the new buildings in 
relation to the neighborhood; and the increase in traffic.  R. 0345-0349. She also 
noted that there are no overnight tourist accommodations in the immediate vicinity 
of the proposed use.  R. 0334.  
20. Another long term neighbor also living on Arches Drive is perhaps 
representative in that he stated his belief that the applicant had not satisfied his 
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burden of proof to show that the proposed use would not adversely affect the 
residential character of the neighborhood.  R. 0357-0359.    
21. In advance of final action by the City Council, the Owners submitted a 
detailed rebuttal outlining the ordinance criteria and explaining why they believed 
they had met all requirements.    R. 0320-0321.  The statement did not include 
any proposals as to conditions which might mitigate the impacts associated with 
the business.  Id.   
22. City Staff provided a report to the Council outlining the Planning 
Commission recommendation, staff’s review of the project, and staff’s assessment 
as to compliance with applicable criteria.  R. 0293-0304. 
23. The City Council reconvened on November 25, 2014.  A motion to approve 
the application was made and seconded.  R. 0371.  Discussion by the Council 
followed. 
24. Upon a final vote one Council member voted in favor of the application and 
three Council members voted against.  Supplemental Record, Minutes of 
November 25, 2014 Council meeting.  R. 0408-0411 (Council Minutes).   
25. The record of the Council decision shows that Councilman Gregg Stucki 
made a detailed and thoughtful plea for approval of the application.  R. 0371-380. 
26. Councilwoman Kirstin Peterson argued against the application, noting that 
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this is fact specific inquiry as to whether the proposed use is the “right fit for the 
right place.”  Id. at 0380.  She also noted that the Moab General Plan, as adopted 
by the City, calls for the City to restrict the expansion of commercial development 
in residential zones, and that in this instance the use is incompatible with the 
neighborhood.  Id. 0381. 
27. The Moab General Plan, in relevant part, states a goal of achieving 
“..attractive, stable, and safe residential areas.”  R. 0621.  To implement that goal, 
the General Plan states that the City is to “restrict commercial development in 
residential zones.”  Id.   
28. Councilwoman Heila Hershadi voice the concern that residents of Moab 
believe that commercial development is “taking over” neighborhoods, and that she 
could not support this application.  Id. at 0382-03834. 
29. Councilman Baily stated that he was on the planning commission when 
changes to the ordinances were discussed, and that the clear intent of the 
ordinances was to listen to neighbor concerns by requiring that bed and breakfasts 
                                                 
4 This concern illustrates the context of the review of the conditional use permit 
application.  The City Council received a request from the Planning Commission 
at the October 28, 2014 meeting (the same night that the instant application was 
reviewed) that the City adopt a moratorium on the conversion of residential 
properties to overnight rentals because of the shortage of affordable housing in 
Moab. R. 0275-280  
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have “clearly minimal negative impacts,” and that this application’s impacts would 
not be minimal.  Id. at 0383. 
30. After briefing and oral argument, the Seventh Judicial District Court 
overturned the Council decision in its Ruling of January 20, 2016. R. 0537-0549.  
The trial court held, first, that the City erred in concluding that traffic would pose 
an undue burden on the neighborhood; second, that noise concerns were mere 
speculation; and third, that the City gave undue credence to public clamor.  Id.     
31. A request by the City for stay of the Court’s decision, R. 0592-0599, was 
rejected on March 1, 2016.  R. 1006.   
VI.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
In its order the trial court reversed the decision of the City Council, 
concluding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that impacts of the 
proposed land use were likely to be problems.  Instead, the trial court held that the 
City improperly yielded to public clamor in opposition to the application.  As set 
forth below, the trial court erred by failing to recognize that the proposed use was 
inconsistent with the City’s General Plan, which restricts the encroachment of 
commercial use in residential areas.  Second, the trial court incorrectly applied the 
so-called public clamor doctrine, rejecting the testimony and evidence from 
neighboring property owners without finding that these persons acted with an 
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improper purpose.  Third, though the trial court criticized the City Council 
decision as not being supported by written findings, it improperly refused to grant 
a remand for additional findings.  And fourth, the trial court misapplied the 
standard of review by engaging in its own fact finding and discounting the 
judgments of the local government.   
VII. ARGUMENT 
 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW.  
 
A court reviewing a local land use decision shall presume that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation…is valid; and determine only whether or not the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.  U.C.A. §10-9a-
801(3)(a)(i) and (ii).  Local land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of 
deference, and local officials should be afforded a “wide latitude of discretion” in 
their decision making.  Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 
P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984).  A decision of a land use authority is “valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal.”  U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(3)(c).  The “substantial evidence” standard of 
review applies to review of municipal decisions concerning the grant or denial of a 
conditional use permit.  Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 127 
P.3d 1270, 1275 (Utah App. 2005).  Substantial evidence is that quantum and 
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quality of evidence that is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to reach a 
particular conclusion.  Id.   
Last, an appellate court is not bound to accord any deference to a trial court 
decision where, as is the case here, the trial court is reviewing a matter based on 
the administrative record before a local government, without taking new testimony.  
Davis v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah App. 1988).    
2. THE CITY PROPERLY REJECTED THE EXPANSION OF A 
COMMERCIAL USE IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA WHERE THE 
MOAB LAND USE PLAN, AS MADE MANDATORY BY 
ORDINANCE, DISCOURAGES SUCH USES. 
 
 The trial court noted that the City rejected the application, in part, based on 
the fact that it did not conform to the City’s General Plan.  R. 0541.  That said, 
the trial court erred in giving no credence to this legal defect. 
 a. The Zoning Favors Stable Residential Development. 
 
The subject property is located in the R-2 zoning district, an ordinance 
designation which is “characterized by smaller lots and somewhat denser 
residential environment than the R-1 zone..” but which includes “..spacious yards 
and other residential amenities adequate to maintain desirable residential 
conditions..” including one and two family dwellings.  MMC 17.45.010.  Apart 
from residential uses, the only other permitted uses in the R-2 zone include 
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schools, libraries, churches, agriculture, home occupations, and child day care 
centers.  See MMC 17.45.020 (use requirements).  A bed and breakfast facility is 
not a use by right in the R-2 district, but it may be allowed as a conditional use.  
Id. at (L); also MMC 17.09.530(B)(use matrix).  
b. A Conditional Use Requires Compliance with Stringent Approval 
Criteria. 
 
 A conditional use is defined to mean a use of land that: 
“..because of its unique characteristics or potential impact on the municipality, 
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some 
areas, or may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts.” U.C.A. § 10-9a-103(5).   
 
Under the Utah Land Use Development and Management Act (LUDMA) local 
governments are empowered to enact ordinances that require conditional uses to 
comply with standards in the ordinance.  U.C.A. § 10-9a-507(1).  If reasonable 
conditions can be imposed to mitigate the adverse effects of a conditional use, the 
applicant is entitled to approval; if not the use may be denied.  Id. at (2)(a), (b).   
Moab’s ordinances contain detailed provisions for all conditional uses, and 
provisions specifically applicable to bed and breakfast uses.  
MMC 17.09.530(general approval criteria); 17.09.531(9)(conditions for bed and 
breakfast conditional uses).  The ordinance provides that the burden of proof is on 
the applicant.  MMC 17.09.530(H)(stating that the applicant shall adequately 
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demonstrate that the criteria have been met).  These criteria are as follows:  
“1.    The proposed conditional use and accessory uses are compatible with 
adjacent existing uses and other allowed uses in the zoning district.  Such 
compatibility shall be expressed in terms of appearance, architectural scale and 
features, site design and scope, landscaping, as well as the control of adverse 
impacts including noise, vibration, smoke, fumes, gas, dust, odor, lighting, 
glare, traffic minimization or circulation, parking issues, or other undesirable 
or hazardous conditions. 
2.    The proposed conditional use has incorporated design features sufficient to 
protect adjacent uses including but not limited to:  service areas, pedestrian and 
vehicular circulation, safety provisions, access ways to and from the site, 
buffering, fencing, and site building placement. 
3.    The proposed use is not detrimental to the public, health, safety and welfare 
through effective management or prohibition of outdoor storage, a required 
sewer connection, and proper disposal of waste. 
4.    Adequate public services such as streets, off-street parking, pedestrian 
facilities, water, sewer, gas, electricity, police, fire, and EMS protection must 
be available without the reduction of services to other existing uses. 
5.    Provisions for proper maintenance of the building, parking and loading 
areas, drives, lighting, signs, landscaping, etc. shall be provided. 
6.    The proposed conditional use shall conform to all regulations of this code 
concerning adopted plans, hours of operation, polices and requirements for 
parking and loading, signs, highway access, and all other applicable 
regulations. 
7.    The use is consistent with the city of Moab general plan as amended. 
8.    The applicant must demonstrate that site impacts within the property as 
well as adjoining properties have been fully mitigated appropriate to the 
topography of the site.  The review of impacts include, at a minimum, slope 
retention, flood potential, and possible damage to riparian or hillside areas. 
9.    After considering the public comment relating the criteria listed above in 
relation to the requested conditional use permit, the planning commission shall 
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adopt a resolution stating their findings of the applicant’s demonstrated ability 
to meet the criteria for a conditional use permit.  Approval or denial of the 
application by the city council shall be memorialized in the minutes of the 
meeting.  A determination that the applicant has not met one or more of the 
applicable criteria shall be sufficient to deny the request…”  Id. 
Among the criteria specific to bed and breakfast facilities are the following:   
“1.  Bed and breakfast facilities, rooming and/or boarding houses may be 
allowed as a conditional use permit where applicant can show evidence of 
compliance with outlined standards and procedures and where there is clearly 
minimal negative impact on adjacent residential properties and 
neighborhoods…”   MMC 17.09.531(9)(A)(1)(italics added) 
 
Additionally, the facility must meet several other criteria: 
 
“1.    The bed and breakfast facility shall not unduly increase local traffic in 
the immediate neighborhood.  Road design and access shall be considered in 
the planning commission’s recommendation.  Construction and alterations of 
bed and breakfast facilities shall not alter the residential character of 
residential zones and of the dwelling.”  MMC 17.09.531(9)(B)(1).   
 
The remaining criteria are focused on parking; limitations on length of guest stays; 
bulk standards; limitations on the number of rooms; signage; and the like.  See Id. 
at (B)(2)-(9).  Thus, under Moab ordinances, the grant of a conditional use permit 
for a bed and breakfast in a residential zone is subject to a number of site specific 
criteria pertaining to neighborhood impacts, and one of those criteria is that the 
application must be consistent with the General Plan5.   
                                                 
5 The trial court did not rule that the conditional use permit ordinance is unlawful, 
nor have the Owners attacked the validity of same.  R. 1068 
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c. The Council Properly Denied the Application for Inconsistency 
with the General Plan. 
 
Under LUDMA every municipality is required to adopt a comprehensive 
long range general plan covering land use matters, growth, community needs, the 
efficient use of land, and the like.  U.C.A. § 10-9(a)-401.  Although a general 
plan is an advisory document for land use decisions, the impact of that document 
may be altered by ordinance. U.C.A. § 10-9a-405.  And, where a city denies a 
land use application because the application is found to be incompatible with a 
comprehensive land use plan, that decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
Tolman v. Logan City, 167 P.3d 489, 495 (Utah App. 2007)(affirming denial of 
rezoning where application was inconsistent with land use plan favoring single 
family residences).  Similarly, case law from other jurisdictions holds that a 
municipality may properly deny a conditional use permit authorizing a commercial 
use where that use is found to be inconsistent with the objectives of a 
comprehensive plan.  See Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 
712, 717-718 (Minn., 1978)(city properly denied conditional use for gravel pit 
where comprehensive plan favored preservation of rural area). Issuance of an 
adjudicatory land use permit which is inconsistent with mandatory provisions of a 
general plan is invalid, and may be set aside.  See Land Waste Management v. 
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Contra Costa Cty. Bd. Of Supervisors, 222 Cal. App. 3d 950, 958 (Cal. App. 
1990). 
Here, the Moab ordinances require that the Owners show that their proposed 
“use is consistent with the City of Moab General Plan, as amended.6”  MMC 
17.09.530(G)(7).  In relevant part, the General Plan favors “attractive, stable, and 
safe residential areas..”  R. 06217.  To implement that goal, the plan provides that 
the City will “restrict commercial development in residential zones.”  Id.  Related 
provisions call for the City to “separate and buffer conflicting land uses, especially 
where commercial abuts residential.”  Id. 0607.  The import of these provisions is 
that the City is directed to move cautiously when commercial development is 
proposed in residential areas, and that such development may not be appropriate in 
every case. The Council noted these concerns when it denied the application. 
Statement of Facts, supra, ¶26. 
The particular site constraints noted in the record, the established character 
of the subdivision; the location on a cul de sac; the siting at the top of a hill; the 
relatively small lot sizes; the proximity to OHV recreation areas; the prospect of 
                                                 
6 The Owners have not brought any legal claims challenging the validity or 
enforceability of the Moab General Plan.   
 
7 The entire text of the General Plan is the record at R. 0602-0666. 
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OHV use by guests; existing noise and traffic complaints; and the qualitative 
change of tourists coming and going at all hours; could properly give rise to 
legitimate concern, as expressed in the record here, that the proposed use is 
incompatible with the location.  Given the expressed General Plan policy of 
discouraging the encroachment of commercial uses in residential areas, the City 
acted properly, and in conformity with the law in denying the application here.  It 
was error for the trial court to overrule this lawful interpretation of the Moab 
ordinances.    
3. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY LABELLED THE COUNCIL  
DECISION AS YIELDING TO PUBLIC CLAMOR IN THE 
ABSENCE OF A FINDING OF IMPROPER PURPOSE OR MOTIVE. 
 
 The trial court held that the City Council improperly yielded to public 
clamor in opposition to the bed and breakfast.  R. 0548.  In doing so the Court 
applied an incorrect legal standard.   
The grant or denial of a conditional use permit may not be predicated solely 
on the consent of neighboring land owners.  Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 
440, 445 (Utah 1981).  But, there is no impropriety in a local government relying 
upon the testimony or other information which may be provided by landowners in 
the vicinity.  Id.  Indeed, the very nature of a conditional use is that it may result 
in adverse consequences for neighbors, see U.C.A. § 10-9a-103(5), and those 
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persons have a legally protected right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  U.S. Const. Amend, 1.  Neighbors may be the most credible and 
knowledgeable witnesses as to the likely effects of a change in land use.   
Similarly, a local government need not apply trial-type rules of evidence in 
weighing public comment on a land use matter.  Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 
P.3d 47, 55 (Utah 2003).  And local administrative bodies must be given some 
deference as to their resolution of conflicting testimony.  Rosen v. Saratoga 
Springs City, 288 P.3d 606, 612 (Utah App. 2012).   
Precedent from this Court holds that public opposition to a land use 
application should not invalidate a local government decision unless the reasons 
for denial have no support in the record, or it is apparent that those reasons are 
mere pretext for public prejudice.  See Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne 
County, 127 P.3d 1270, 1277-1278 (Utah App. 2005)(noting that safety concerns 
for mental health facility were inconclusive in the record, and citing Davis v. 
Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988), for the proposition that the public 
is uniformly opposed to prison, mental health, or similar facilities).  Implicit in 
this analysis, as stated in Uintah County, is that public opposition to a land use 
application only becomes improper “clamor” where it is cover for other, 
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discriminatory, motives8.   
Given the particular attributes of a conditional use, including the fact that it 
is designed to address negative externalities affecting other property owners, it is 
error to simply discount neighbor testimony that is addressed to the substantive 
approval criteria in the absence of a finding of prejudice, improper motive, or 
evidence of improprieties in the decision making.  See Davis v. Clearfield City, 
756 P.2d at 711 (noting that the local government held closed-door meetings and 
resorted to as asking for a show of hands from the audience as to 
support/opposition to the application Fn.9); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448-449 (1985)(courts may properly disregard public 
objections to conditional use decision where they are the product of discriminatory 
motives—such as fear of the mentally handicapped).   
Here, the testimony from neighbors was uniformly addressed to whether the 
application met the criteria in the ordinance, and whether it could satisfy the 
obligation that it have “clearly minimal negative impact” on the adjacent 
                                                 
8 To the extent that this Court’s previous analysis of the issue in Uintah County 
leaves this question unclear, the City respectfully requests that this Court take this 
opportunity to hold that improper clamor must be predicated upon some finding of 
discriminatory motive or improper purpose, not mere opposition based on 
ordinance-based criteria.   
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residential areas.  The trial court did not find any discriminatory motive, nor did it 
conclude that these objections were made in bad faith.  Nor does this case concern 
a group which is subject to prejudice, such mental health patients.  At most, the 
trial court found that the testimony from the various parties was in conflict.  Under 
these circumstances it was error to simply dismiss the landowner opposition as 
improper clamor, not fit to be considered9.   
4. WHILE CRITICISING THE LACK OF FINDINGS, THE COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER A REMAND FOR A CLEARER 
RECORD. 
 
 In its ruling the trial court noted the lack of explicit findings to support the  
rationale for the Council Decision.  R. 0540.  At oral argument this was a 
substantial bone of contention, with the trial court questioning the validity of a 
decision that was not accompanied by specific findings of fact.  R. 1059-1061.   
 It is axiomatic that if an administrative record is deemed lacking in specific  
findings sufficient to permit review, then the remedy is to remand for further 
findings identifying the basis for decision.  See La Sal Oil Co. v. Dept. of 
Environmental Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047-1048 (Utah App. 1992); see also 
                                                 
9 In its ruling the trial court gratuitously, and without record support, implied that 
the City Council was acting merely to curry favor with voters.  R. 0548.  Again, 
this statement suggests that the trial court lost its way in applying the correct legal 
standard to the review of testimony focused on the criteria in the ordinances.  
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West Valley City v. Roberts, 993 P.2d 252 (Utah App. 1999)(remedy for lack of 
adequate record in land use proceeding is remand for new hearing).   
Here the applicable ordinance does not require written findings, merely that 
the decision be announced on the record and commemorated in the minutes of the 
Council.  MMC 17.09.530(G)(9).  But, without conceding that the decision was 
defective, the City explicitly requested that the trial court remedy any perceived 
defect by remanding for further findings of fact.  R. 1094, 1102.  To the extent 
that the lack of findings impaired the decision of the Council, and thus led to the 
reversal by the trial court, the appropriate response is to order a remand for further 
process, rather than simply reversing the decision.   
5. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
 
In the review of an adjudicatory land use decision the role of the court is 
limited to determining whether there is evidence in the record to support the local 
government action.  Xanthos v. Board of Adjustments of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 
1032, 1035 (Utah 1984).  The trial judge is not empowered to weigh anew the 
underlying factual considerations or policy judgments made by the city, in effect 
substituting his judgments for that of the local government.  Id.  In this case the 
applicable ordinance is genuinely strict in its policy of requiring that a bed and 
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breakfast show “clearly minimal negative impact on adjacent residential properties 
and neighborhoods.”  MMC 17.09.531(9)(A)(1).  But, in rejecting the Council 
decision, the trial court engaged in an exacting trial-type review in which the court 
substituted its own preferences for the decisions of the City Council, deeming the 
evidence against the application to be mere speculation.     
In its ruling, the trial court proceeded to make its own findings, engaging in 
its own calculation of traffic impacts by comparing record evidence to outside 
sources such as Google Earth.  R. 0543-0545. Significantly, this analysis was at 
odds with the testimony from various parties, and amounted to an effort to buttress 
the position of the Owners, who did not offer a traffic study to carry their own 
burden of proof.   
Additionally, the trial court’s ruling, and the record at oral argument, is 
suffused with the Court’s hostility towards the presumed motivations of the 
members of the City Council, and to the process selected by City ordinances, 
which was to have the Council serve as the land use authority.  R. 1094-1095 
(noting the unsatisfactory nature of a decision making process involving 
politicians); R. 1074, 1075 (noting City Council, being subject to political pressure, 
might not be able to do their duty).  Moreover, the trial court’s colloquy with 
counsel suggests a hostility to basic judgments of the fact finder.  R. 1079 (stating 
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that one half acre lot size of the subject property is “not small to me”).  
These statements in the record show that the trial court misapplied the standard of 
review, and instead essentially cast the burden of proof onto the City.   
In fact, the City Council was faced with a dense suburban setting, which 
presents a host of greater development impacts, as opposed to development which 
might be proposed in a sparsely populated area.  Yet, the trial court deemed those 
concerns trivial.   
 Further, the trial court’s effort to isolate the various factors, noise, traffic, 
parking, and the like, from one another ignores that the City Council had to weigh 
the totality of the application.  Here the City could and did conclude that the 
collective impacts, on balance, did not meet the requisite certainty, the “clearly 
minimal negative impact” required to grant approval under the ordinance.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
 
 The City of Moab requests that the decision of the trial court be reversed and 
that the decision of the City Council denying the conditional use permit be found 
to be valid.  In the alternative, if the Court concludes that additional findings are 
required, then the City requests a remand for a hearing before the Council and 
additional findings.  
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IX.  APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
 
A. Trial Court Ruling; 
B. Moab Conditional Use Ordinance; 
C. R-2 Zoning Ordinance; and 
D. Moab Noise Ordinance. 
 
Submitted this 6th day of June, 2016. 
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